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IN THE SUPREME C~OURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOLEN REES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 8860 
EDWARD B. SCOTT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, and THOMAS 
C. CUTHBERT, appearing specially for the sole purpose 
of resisting this appeal from the Trial Court's order 
quashing service of summons upon Dr. Edward B. Scott, 
file the following brief of respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant attempted to commence an action for 
alienation of affections against respondent, a resident 
of California, by service of summons. The summons was 
served by a Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake County upon 
Dr. Scott personally, but at the time of service, the deputy 
sheriff did not endorse upon the copy left with Dr. Scott 
the date upon which the same was served, nor did he 
sign his name thereto, nor did he add his official title 
thereto (Record p. 5). 
On February 19, 1958, respondent, appearing spe-
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2 
cially through his attorneys, filed a motion to quash 
the service of summons. This motion was heard on 
February 26, 1958, and said motion was granted. 
Respondent takes issue with the statement of facts 
contained in Appellant's Brief in the following respects: 
(1) Statement on page 5 that on the 19th day of 
February, 1958, attorney for Respondent receipted for a 
copy of the complaint. There is nothing in the record 
before this Court to support this statement, nor was 
the point raised in any way before the trial court. 
(2) Statement on page 4 as to reason for Dr. 
Scott leaving the State of Utah. These matters are based 
upon the affidavit of Dr. Molen Rees, Appellant, in 
support of a motion to amend process, and were not 
before the Court on the motion to quash summons. The 
statements contained in said affidavit are incompetent 
in stating a condition of mind of the Respondent and 
are hearsay as to statements concerning any return of 
Respondent to this state. Respondent points out that 
under a special appearance it was not possible to resist 
this motion and therefore no contrary evidence on these 
points could be offered, and further that any attempts 
to avoid process, except refusing service of summons, 
are wholly immaterial to a question of whether a de-
fendant is properly served with process. 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE FAILURE TO ENDORSE THE DATE AND PLA·CE 
OF SERVICE ON COPY OF SUMMONS LEFT WITH DE· 
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FENDANT WAS A FATAL DEFECT, AND WHERE TIMELY 
ATTACKED BY MOTION, THE SERVICE MUST BE QUASH-
ED IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS 
MISLED. 
Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
"At the time of service, the person making 
such service shall endorse upon the copy of the 
summons left for the person being served, the 
date upon which the same was served, and shall 
sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his 
official title." 
This rule is the same in substance as the provisions 
of Sec. 104-5-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. This Court 
in the case of Thomas vs. District Court, 171 Pac. 2d 
667 (1946) specifically considered this provision in a 
fact situation substantially identical to that in the case 
at bar. In that case the plaintiff commenced an action 
in Salt Lake County by filing a complaint, and a police 
officer of the Salt Lake City Police Department served 
the summons on Defendant personally but did not en-
dorse upon the copy of the summons left with Defendant 
the date of service, nor did the officer sign his name 
or official title thereon. Defendant, appearing specially, 
filed a motion to quash the service of summons. The 
District Court denied the motion. Defendant then brought 
the action before the Supreme Court by certiorari against 
the District Court and Hon. J. Allan Crockett, District 
Judge. 
The defense was raised that the Defendant had 
not been misled and therefore a motion to quash should 
not be granted. The Court says at pages 670-1: 
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"The date endorsed indicates the time within 
which defendant must appear. If the date is not 
endorsed the defendant would have no definite 
date fixed by the summons to appear. The statute 
directs that the server, at the time of service, 
must endorse on the copy the date of service, and 
leave it with defendant. This enables the person 
served to check against the server the date, so 
the return will [not] indicate a date different 
from the real date served. If summons is served 
in advance of filing complaint, and complaint is 
not filed within ten days after service, the service 
of summons and filing of complaint are both 
void and the court should dismiss the action and 
require the plaintiff to begin all over again. Sec-
tion 104-5-9, L-:-.c.A. 1943: Reese vs. Judges, 52 
Utah 520, 175 P. 601; James vs. Jensen, 50 Utah 
485, 167 P. 827. If date is not endorsed on copy 
defendant could not avail himself of this right 
on the record. And where a summons is served 
not on defendant personally but by leaving it at 
his usual place of abode, during his absence per-
haps for a few days, he would not know on his 
return when he must appear or be in default. 
These matters are not disputed by 'The Court,' 
but it argues that Plaintiff here n1ust allege and 
show he was Inisled b~~ the defect. Such is not 
the provision of the statute. ~-\.nd we find no well 
reasoned, adjudicated case. holding that where 
service is attacked b~~ Inotion before pleading or 
judgment, the trial court can inquire into the 
question of being misled. * * * 
"\Vithout prolonging the discussion we con-
clude t~at the failure to endorse the date ~nd place 
of service on the cop~~ of the sun1n1ons as required 
h)T Sec. 104-5-7 quoted supra is a fatal defect ·when 
tin1ely attacked by n1otion, and such service of 
sun11nons should be quashed., 
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In Appellant's Brief, the concurring opinion of the 
Thomas case is urged for the proposition that failure to 
endorse time of service is not jurisdictional. Whether or 
not failure to endorse time of service is jurisdictional is 
not a controlling factor in the case at bar but rather, 
whether the lower court properly sustained a motion 
to quash which was timely made. Careful analysis of 
the concurring opinion demonstrates that Justices Wolfe 
and McDonough were concerned first as to whether or 
not certiorari was the proper remedy to be invoked in 
that case, or whether it should have been prohibition; 
and secondly, whether the failure to endorse made a 
judgment based on such service void and subject to col-
lateral attack or only voidable, which would be subject 
only to a direct attack and would be waived if not raised 
by timely motion. The concurring opinion holds that a 
court has jurisdiction to determine the question of its 
own jurisdiction and when it is in the process of de-
termining its jurisdiction it is not exceeding its juris-
diction and therefore certiorari would not lie, the proper 
writ being prohibition. On the second question the con-
curring opinion states, at pages 673-4: 
"I am of the opinion that the irregularity 
in the case at bar is such that the service was 
voidable. By that I mean the defendant hy timel)· 
and proper attack may have the service set aside. 
Before judgment (absent a general appearance) 
the proper attack was motion to quash the service. 
Had a default judgment been entered - appeal 
or motion to set aside the judgment as provided 
for by Section 104-4-4, U.C.A. 1943, or suit in 
equity to set aside the judgment would have been 
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possible attacks. However, the service though de-
fective gave the court jurisdiction of the defend-
ant and had a judgment been entered pursuant 
thereto it could not have been successfully at-
tacked collaterally on grounds of no jurisdiction 
of the defendant." 
The foregoing quotation demonstrates that by fol-
lowing the reasoning of either the majority opinion or 
concurring opinion the ruling of the trial court was cor-
rect in quashing summons in the case at bar. 
That the result achieved in the Thomas case is 
proper in the light of the history of this provision is 
demonstrated by an examination of the enactment of 
this provision in 1898. An almost identical provision 
is to be found in our civil procedure since its enactment 
as Section 2944 Revised Laws of Utah, 1898. Prior to 
this time an action could be commenced only by the 
filing of a complaint (See Section 3202, Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1888). Section 29±-1 was added to the code at 
the time our procedure was changed to permit the com-
mencement of an action by service of summons, and was 
taken from Section 2635a, Annotated Statutes of 'Yis-
consin, 1889. The Wisconsin provision is substantially 
identical with Sec. 2944, Revised Laws of Utah 1898, 
with one very notable exception. Section 2635a provided 
as follows: 
"Any sheriff or other person, authorized to 
serve a summons and who shall serYe a summons 
which shall be the com1nencen1ent of an action 
in any court in this state, shall at the time of 
service thereof, indor~e upon th~ copy or copies 
of such summons whiCh he shall deliver to the 
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defendant or defendants in such action, the date 
upon which the same was so served, and sign his 
name thereto, and if an officer, his official title; 
provided that nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to invalidate a service not made in 
conformity with the requirements of this act and 
provided further that the officers making such 
service and failing to make the indorsement there-
on provided for, shall not tax any fees therefor." 
When the Utah provision was enacted, the proviso 
of the Wisconsin act that the failure to indorse did 
not invalidate the service was omitted. This is a strong 
indication that it was intended by the Utah law that 
the failure to make the indorsement would invalidate the 
service of summons. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Winters v. 
Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 24 P. 759, under somewhat similar 
provisions of Utah procedural laws said in the syllabus: 
"A summons which fails to state the time 
and place at which a defendant is required to ap-
pear and answer the complaint filed against him 
is defective, and will be quashed upon motion 
interposed before appearance and plea." 
In seeking decisions from other jurisdictions on this 
point, counsel has found only one other state with a 
similar indorsement provision, namely, Georgia. In 1946, 
the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Legislature 
adopted an indorsement provision substantially the same 
as the Utah provision. Rule 6 of Rules of Procedure, 
Pleading and Practice in Civil Actions, Georgia Court 
Rules, effective January 1, 1947, page 34; Georgia Laws 
1946, p. 761 at p. 769. 
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Three cases were decided by the Georgia Courts 
under this provision holding failure to indorse the copy 
served was jurisdictional. In the case of Payne v. Moore 
Finance Company, 87 Ga. App. 627, 74 S.E. 2d 746 
( 1953) the court said : 
"The only question in this case is whether 
a judgment against a defendant is void where 
he was personally served with a copy of petition 
and process, and the serving officer failed to 
show the date of service on such copy and sign 
it, and where the defendant did nothing to waive 
the omission. \Y e think that the requirement of 
the Resolution passed by the General Assembly, 
Ga. L. 1946, pp 761, 769, Code Annotated, Supp. 
Sec. 81-202 providing that each copy served on 
a defendant shall show a date of service signed 
by the officer serving is mandatory and jurisdic-
tional in the absence of waiver of jurisdiction of 
the person." 
See also Jennings ~:. Dacis, 92 Ga. App. 265, 88 S.E. 
2d 544 (1955); Jones v. Roberts Jlarble Company, 90 
Ga. App. 830, 84 S.E. 2d 469 (1954). 
Appellant's brief argues that the failure to endorse 
should be construed as hannless error under the pro-
visions of Rule 61, U.R.C.P. This was the precise ground 
upon which the defense ·was n1ade in the Thomas case, 
supra. It is noteworthy that at the tilne of the decision 
of the Thomas case, sections 104-14-7 and 104-39-3, r.C.~-i. 
1943 were in effect and are substantially the same in 
in effect as Rule 61. In the Thomas ease, this Court 
ruled that the n1otion to quash should be granted irre-
spective of whether or not the defendant had been 1nisled. 
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A person who faces a substantial judgment by de-
fault if his answer is not timely filed has the right to 
know without any question the time within which he must 
act. Under our procedure, the only proof he has of this 
time is the endorsement of the date, signed by the 
person serving the summons. This must be done at the 
time of service and therefore is not subject to any 
weaknesses of recollection of the person serving such 
as a return of service might be when as much as five 
days after the act. The copy of the summons left with 
a defendant is the only record which he has in his 
possession, and the most vital piece of information on 
the summons, namely when the defendant must act, is 
jmparted only if it is properly endorsed as required 
by Rule 4 (j). 
Appellant's Brief suggests on appeal for the first 
time that counsel for Respondent obtained a copy of 
the complaint from the clerk's office and that this makes 
the failure to endorse harmless error. No evidence on 
this point was presented at the hearing of the motion 
to quash, no mention of the point was made to the trial 
court or anywhere until it is mentioned in Appellant's 
Brief, and there is nothing in the record to support 
this statement. For this reason this court cannot consider 
the matter on this appeal. It is respondent's contention 
however that this point is immaterial in the case at bar 
even if it were properly before the court. In the Thomas 
case, supra, the action was commenced by filing of the 
complaint and a copy of the complaint was served with 
the summons. Even conceding the correctness of Appel-
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lant's statement that a copy of the complaint was ob-
tained from the clerk's office, this fact would make the 
two cases parallel at the time the copy of the complaint 
was obtained from the clerk, and the case at bar would 
still come within the ruling of the Thomas case that the 
fact defendant was not misled by the failure to endorse 
is immaterial. 
It is respectfully urged that the trial court com-
mitted no error in its quashing of the service of summons 
in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
and THOMAS C. CUTHBERT. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ADDENDUM 
Counsel, as an officer of this Court and not acting 
for or on behalf of respondent, suggests that this Court 
under its ruling in the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 
3 U 2d 277, 282 Pac. 2d 845, should, of its own motion, 
exam~e whether or not it has acquired jurisdiction of 
this case on appeal in view of tins Court's holdings in 
the case of Honerine llli·ning & Jlilliug Co. r. Tallerday 
Steel Pipe <S· Tank Co., 30 Utah 449, 85 Pac. G:26 and 
State T,ax Commission l'. Larsen, 110 Pac. 2d 558 that 
no appeal will lie frmn an order of the district court 
quashing summons where the action is not dismissed 
but is still pending. Since appellant has filed no petition 
for the granting of an appeal frmn an interlocutory 
order within the tin1e prescribed under Rule 73 (a) as 
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11 
required by Rule 72(b), U.R.C.P., and this Court has 
repeatedly held that the failure to act within the time 
prescribed by Rule 73 (a) prevents the Court from ac-
quiring jurisdiction on the appeal, it would appear that 
this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the present 
appeal in this case. 
In view of the uncertainties of the cases as to 
whether or not a party may raise a question of juris-
diction other than jurisdiction over his person, even on 
appeal, without waiving the question of personal juris-
diction, respondent specifically has not raised this 
question himself, but is only arguing the correctness of 
the trial court's ruling on the question of jurisdiction 
over his person as raised by his motion to quash service 
of summons. 
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